From 2002 to 2005, the German Corporate Governance Code advised that stock listed companies should (voluntarily) disclose individualized executive compensation figures. In a sample of big publicly traded German companies, we examine which determinants drive firms to comply with that "soft law" requirement. Using a probit model, we consider 15 explanatory variables. We find that block-holdings, average executive remuneration, book-to-market ratio and the percentage of union representatives in the supervisory board significantly decrease the likelihood of disclosures on individualized executive compensation numbers. Firm size, the absolute number of supervisory board members and the presence of takeover activity turn out as having a significant positive influence on the disclosure behavior. Additionally, we find that it was less likely in 2002 that individualized remuneration figures were published, indicating that Code recommendations are considered as more binding than Code suggestions.
Regulation concerning disclosures of executive compensation figures has undergone a significant change in Germany during the last decade. Traditionally, Art. 285 No. 9 of the German Commercial Law (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB) demanded disclosures about the total amount of fixed and variable compensation of the management board members. According to Art. 286 (4) HGB, such numbers were not allowed to be disclosed in cases where conclusions about the remuneration of single board members were possible. This regulation was explained by the legislator's fears that such disclosures would violate privacy protection, a base right deductible from the German constitution. However, in 2005, this approach changed with an amendment that made disclosures of individualized executive compensation figures a legal requirement for financial years beginning after December 31 th (German Parliament 2005 . This decision was caused by a longstanding public debate about the amount of management compensation, which was frequently perceived as exaggerated. Executive compensation made headlines in the mass media especially in context of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 2000, and in a following lawsuit courts had to judge whether settlements paid to the former company officials were appropriate. 1 This made (some) compensation practices known to the general public. With the German economy facing an overall downward trend, the impression spread that a lot of board members behave in a self-serving fashion while at the same time they lay off their staff.
However, the amendment of 2005 has a precursor: From 2002 to 2005, the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) advised companies to disclose individualized executive compensation numbers on a voluntary basis. The Code is not law itself but Article 161 of the Stock Corporation Act forms its legal base (Nietsch 2005: 371) . The GCGC aims to define internationally recognized standards for good and responsible governance that are formulated as recommendations or suggestions (Kühne & Fuss 2003: 229) .
Companies have to disclose annually any deviation from the Code's recommendations in a Declaration of Conformity. This is sometimes labeled as a "comply or explain" approach (Cromme 2005: 363 3 In our analysis we raise the question which determinants or firm characteristics drive companies (not) to comply with the Code's advice to publish individualized executive compensation figures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In chapter 2, we outline our hypotheses and specify the model for an empirical analysis. In chapter 3, the sample and data sources are described. In chapter 4, the main findings of the study will be discussed. The article ends with a summary and discussion in chapter 5.
Hypothesis Development and Model Specification
In our analysis, we assess the influence of 15 independent variables on a company's disclosure behavior with respect to the GCGC's advice to publish individualized executive compensation figures. The variables proxy for important firm characteristics. The compliance behavior of a particular company is measured by the dummy variable COMPDISC ("compensation disclosure") which takes a value of 1 if a company discloses individualized compensation figures and thus follows the Code's advice and zero otherwise. As the dependent variable is categorical, we use a multivariate probit model for the analysis of the influence of the independent variables. It is not that obvious which firm characteristics might have a strong bearing on the disclosure behavior. Thus, we use a relatively high number of independent variables selected according to the framework outlined by Börsch-Supan/Köke (2002). The authors argue that missing explanatory variables are a general problem of empirical studies on corporate governance and suggest the complete use of specific information concerning ownership, financial and board structure, competition situation and takeover activities. Table 1 provides an overview over the variables used in our analysis and the predicted signs of the influence on compliance with the Code's advice.
To account for ownership structure, we first consider block-holdings (blckhol). Block-holdings by non-banking companies are measured as the fraction of common stock held by the three largest shareholders. We assume that the presence of blockholdings decreases the likelihood of compliance as the Code is an instrument intended to strengthen external (i.e., market) control. Block-holders are, in fact, insiders because they have access to a company's supervisory board (Hackethal et al. 2005: 398) . The code requires disclosure of individual compensation for management and supervisory board members. With the strong capital connection of big German companies it is likely that supervisory board members of one firm are management board members in another. (Schilling 2001: 149) This reduces the incentives of block holder representatives to press for individual disclosures of management board remuneration. Inversely, we hypothesize that the same arguments lead to an increasing likelihood of Code compliance if the level of block-holdings is low (and market pressure high).
In the German "insider" corporate governance system, universal banks have traditionally played an important role (Hackethal et al. 2005 : 399 ff). Thus, we use bank ownership (bnkown) as a proxy for monitoring activities of universal banks (bank ownership is defined as a percentage of common stock owned by universal banks). "Insider control systems" typically provide large control benefits for the major shareholders who are in our case banks (see Hart 1995 , for some critical comments). Bank dominance has constituted a stable and effective element of corporate governance. Gorton/Schmid (2000), among others, provide evidence of the positive influence of bank block holdings on the performance of German companies. However, the relationship between bank ownership and the degree of compliance with the Code is not straightforward. On the one hand, it is possible that the abovementioned block-holder arguments apply as well. On the other hand, banks might have interests different than those of (industry) block-holders. However, Edwards/Nibler (2000) argue that bank influence on company policies should not be over-estimated. We therefore make no predictions on the expected sign.
We do not have data to directly observe the fraction of a company's shares that are held by foreigners. However, if a company's shares are listed at foreign exchanges, this indicates that this company tries to attract foreign investors. If disclosures about individualized executive compensation figures are international best practice (as the Code claims), the likelihood of disclosing these numbers should be higher if a company is listed at least at one foreign stock exchange. The dummy variable "xlist" takes a value of 1 for a foreign listing, and we expect a positive sign for this variable. Leverage depicts a company's financial structure. We define leverage (levrge) as the ratio between total debt (numerator) and total assets (denominator). Debt can also be a lever of control (Jensen 1986; Cable 1985) . Debt holders are expected to monitor firm performance more actively if their share in the capital structure increases (e.g., Hutchinson/Gul 2004) . Financial leverage can thus be used as a proxy for external control through debt holders. We expect a positive sign for this. Additionally, we use free cash flow per share (fcfps) and the book-to-market ratio (btm) as proxies for a company's financial structure. With free cash flow increasing, shareholders face a higher risk of management profligacy, which should lead to tighter controls and therefore pressures for additional disclosure. The btm stands for growth opportunities. Growth opportunities may on the one hand lead to more controls whether there are exploited, on the other hand optimistic shareholders may slacken in their wishes for disclosure. We therefore do not predict a sign for this variable. Management board size (nbm), supervisory board size (nsbm), the percentage of union representatives in the supervisory board (umpctg), and average remuneration of the management board members (avgep) are used to account for the board structure. The absolute number of variables considered is relatively high here, to cover the peculiarities of the German two-tier Board Structure. On one hand, the (large) size of the supervisory board is often considered as a problem of the German corporate governance system (Wooldridge/Pannier 2005: 230). On the other hand, a large number of supervisory board members might decrease the influence of particular interest groups like block-holders, banks or unionists, which might work in favor for the control activities of minority shareholders. Remuneration of executives (but also of supervisory board members) plays an important role in providing incentives and attenuating principal-agent problems. Evidently, higher average executive compensation increases the likelihood that payments are higher than appropriate and include large CEO remuneration, which, in turn, induces the receivers of those payments not to give full particulars on them. Thus, we hypothesize a negative influence on compliance.
Firm size (logbs) stands as an explanatory factor for a range of governance issues, i.e., public monitoring, political costs or the ability to draw up market barriers. Firm size is quantified here as the natural logarithm of total assets. We expect a positive influence of firm size on compliance behavior because of the increasing public monitoring and political costs. This becomes obvious if one recalls that CEO remuneration of DAX30-constituents is frequently published in German business magazines. Smaller firms (i.e., Non-Dax30 firms) are not of interest there. Finally, a measure for takeover activities is needed. In Germany, takeover activities are associated with mandatory announcements pursuant to the Securities and Takeover Act (Wertpapererwerbs-und Übernahmegesetz, WpÜG). This law regulates offers to purchase securities that have been issued by a listed company that is target of takeover activities. Any announcement concerning a particular target company will signify that at least for this company a market for control exists. To proxy for takeover activities, we use a dummy variable (tkover) taking a value of 1 if there is a takeover relevant legal announcements pursuant to the WpÜG. We presume a positive relationship between takeover activities and the willingness to publish remuneration particularities, because managers facing a takeover aim to signal that the company is well-governed and that benefits from a takeover are low for shareholders.
We use two additional dummy variables for the respective years We generally perform two-tailed tests of the zero hypotheses that the variables in total (i.e., the model) and each single variable as well, provide significant explanatory power on the value the dependent variable takes. The model is as follows: We control for a possible presence of heteroscedasticity by using White-adjusted standard errors in the multivariate analysis (White 1980 ).
Data sources and Sample description
In our study, we analyze German companies listed in DAX 30 and MDAX in the beginning of 2003. These are the biggest German companies. Our initial sample included 80 companies and 240 firm years. As outlined in Table 2 
Discussion of the Main Findings
Companies in our sample are very diverse in many respects, e.g. profitability, ownership structure, or number of board and supervisory board members. The standard deviation of bank ownership, for example, is more than twice the mean. This is true for free cash flow per share. Descriptive statistics of the variables can be found in Table 3 . Table 4 shows that eight of the independent variables have a statistically significant influence on the disclosure of individualized executive compensation figures. While bank ownership and cross-listings do not seem to have significant influence on the compliance behavior, it turns out that the likelihood of disclosing individualized executive compensation figures decreases considerably with increasing block-holdings. This (expected) finding can theoretically be justified by two arguments: First, block-holders are typically represented in the supervisory board. Thus, they do not need disclosures to gather information about a company or, in particular, about executive compensation. As disclosures on individualized executive compensation figures typically go in hand with disclosures on individualized supervisory board member compensation, they indeed have negative incentives in forcing managers to follow the code. Second, block-holdings are negatively correlated with free float and thus with capital market pressure. In contrast to block-holders, minority shareholders do not have the access to supervisory board and to internal information. Thus, they have to rely on the disclosed information. Therefore, it does not surprise that lower block-holdings, i.e., higher free float, increases the likelihood of compliance with the suggestion/recommendation to disclose individualized executive compensation figures The coefficient on the book-to-market-ratio (btm) also turns out as being negative and significant while the other proxies for financial structure do not have significant influence on the compliance behavior. A possible interpretation of this finding is that firms with higher book-to-market ratio have lower growth opportunities, increasing the likelihood of overinvesting surplus cash. This gives managers incentives to signal that they do not use surplus cash to expropriate investors. Three of the variables used to proxy for board structure have a significant influence on the compliance behavior. First, we find evidence that each additional supervisory board member increases the likelihood of the dependent variable taking a value of 1 i.e., disclosing individualized compensation numbers. This can be explained by an argument that an increasing total number of supervisory board members decreases the influence of particular interest groups. Independent supervisory board members, then, are more likely to act in the interest of minority shareholders. Second, we find that the likelihood of disclosing individualized remuneration figures decreases with an increasing percentage of union representatives in the supervisory board. This is surprising only at a first glance: As unionists often complain about excessive compensation for board members, one would expect that a larger influence of union officials in supervisory boards increases the likelihood that companies do publish individualized compensation figures. However, the actual interrelationship between disclosure behavior and union representation is the reverse. A possible explanation for this finding is that unionists might use questions related to executive remuneration in negotiations about other employee related issues. Thus, they do not want to lose this pressurising instrument. The above-mentioned lawsuit against former Mannesmann officials fits with our finding: A former trade union leader who was a member of the supervisory board, did not exert any actions to prevent the payments in question. The average remuneration of board members itself has a negative impact on the likelihood of individualized compensation disclosures. This is an appealing finding: The more board members earn, the less they are willing to publish these numbers. However, there is a limitation to this interpretation because of missing data with respect to the variance in board compensation. For example, it might be that the height of CEO pay has an influence on the reporting behavior, but we cannot examine this explicitly because there is no possibility to obtain data on CEO remuneration from those firms that did not publish individualized figures.
Firm size also helps to explain the compliance behavior. The coefficient on the firm size variable is significantly different from zero and has a positive sign, indicating that bigger companies are more likely to disclose individualized remuneration figures. This can be traced to the fact that there is greater public monitoring and interest in bigger companies.
If a company is a target of takeover activities, the likelihood of individualized disclosures also increases. This is not surprising either, because the management of a takeover target firm has incentives to signal that the firm is well-governed. This might increase the level of total compliance with the Code and in particular with the recommendation of disclosures about remuneration, because not reporting these numbers might lead the shareholders to conclude that the management is overpaid and thus inefficient.
Finally, the coefficient on the dummy variable for the year 2002 is, as expected, negative and significantly different from zero. This indicates that the individualized executive compensation figures were less likely to be disclosed in 2002 than in 2003 or 2004. This allows us to draw the conclusion that the Code's recommendations are indeed considered as more binding than its suggestions.
Summary
Using a probit model, we investigated the influence that 15 different independent variables have on the compliance level with the GCGC advice to publicize individualized compensation figures. It turned out that the independent variables under consideration significantly help to explain the compliance behavior. We conclude that during 2002 through 2004, compliance with the code was informative about important firm characteristics and thus interesting under a signaling perspective. While this questions the new and tougher regulation at least to some extent, the legal amendment might decrease agency costs for minority shareholders. As outlined, block-holders have an access to internal information. Obviously, they do not consider it as necessary to disclose such information to minority shareholders. Hence, the amendment strengthens the position of minority shareholders as it provides them with more information than they would otherwise dispose of. However, it is hard to predict whether this advantage will compensate for the negative consequences of the tougher regulation.
